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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

ALPHONSO P. MONTANO,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

Case No, 960051-CA

Priority No. 2

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

In addition to the facts and arguments contained in the
State/Appellant's Opening Brief (State Br.), the State submits
the following points in reply to the statements and arguments
contained in defendant's Responsive Brief (Def. Br.).
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF
THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Defendant's Statement of Issues and Standards of Review
fail to set forth the applicable standards of appellate

review as

required under rule 24(a)(5), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Instead, defendant merely recites standards he believes are
applicable to a magistrate's

evaluation of evidence.

The

inaccuracies of defendant's interpretation of the evidentiary and
legal standards applicable to preliminary hearings will be
discussed in the argument portion of this brief.

But whatever

standards apply, defendant's substitution of trial court
evidentiary standards for appellate court review standards is
inappropriate.

The proper standards of appellate review are

contained in the State's brief (State Br. at 2-3 & 5 n.2.)
ARGUMENT
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING COURT ERRED AS A
MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT REFUSED TO VIEW THE
EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE
INFORMATION AND REFUSED TO CREDIT THE
TESTIMONY OF THE VICTIM BECAUSE IT WAS JUST
HER "WORD" AGAINST DEFENDANT

fteply to Defendant's Argument that
a Preliminary Hearing Magistrate
May Refuse to Bind Over Based on
ffis Subjective Assessment pf the
Victim's Credibility
Defendant correctly states that Utah law permits a
preliminary hearing magistrate to assess credibility, but then
improperly interprets this to mean that a magistrate may refuse
to bind over whenever, in the magistrate's subjective opinion, a
victim's testimony is "not believable."

See Def. Br. at 15-20.

Defendant's argument fundamentally misinterprets a magistrate's
role.
»

When a preliminary hearing magistrate assesses
evidence, he must do so objectively.

State v. Pledger. 896 P.2d

1226, 1229 (Utah 1995) (preliminary hearing magistrate is
2

required to view evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and bind over unless the evidence is "wholly lacking
and incapable of reasonable inference" to support an element)
(quoting and applying directed verdict standard enunciated in
Cruz v. Montoya. 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983)).

Under this

objective standard, it is improper for a magistrate to "accept
the defendant's version of the facts over the legitimate
inferences which can be drawn from the [State's] evidence."
People v. District Court. 803 P.2d 193, 196 (Colo. 1990) (cited
with favor in Pledger. 896 P.2d at 1229).

"Weighing the merits

of the case is for the trier of fact at trial."

Id.

Accord

Cruz. 660 P.2d at 728 ("In directing a verdict the trial court
may not weigh the evidence.") See also State Br. at 23-25.
Despite this, defendant argues, in essence, that
Pledger recognizes a subjective standard, a standard defendant
claims was established in State v. Anderson. 612 P.2d 778 (Utah
1980), St?te V, Giles/ 576 P.2d 876 (Utah 1978), and State v.
Wodskow. 896 P.2d 29 (Utah 1995).

Defendant's interpretation is

wrong and relies on a superficial reading of those cases. While
Anderson. £jJLs£, and Wodskow generally comment on a magistrate's
right to assess credibility, none of the cases were decided on
this ground.

State v. Gardiner. 814 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah 1991)
3

(appellate court is not bound by earlier dicta).

To the extent

that these decisions are applicable, they are consistent with
more recent and on-point case law requiring a magistrate to
adjudge credibility only when, as a matter of law, a witness's
testimony is inherently implausible or incredible. State v.
Jaeaer, 896 P.2d 42, 45-46 (Utah App. 1995) (preliminary hearing
magistrate may not decide questions arising from "credible, but
conflicting evidence").

See also Cruz. 660 P.2d at 728-729 (in

directing a verdict, the trial judge does not determine issues of
credibility except as a matter of law) (recognized as preliminary
hearing standard in Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229).

Accord Hunter v.

District Court. 543 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Colo. 1975) (a preliminary
hearing court's inquiry into credibility is limited to the
"plausibility of the story and not general trustworthiness").
The Pledger/Jaeger/Cruz objective standard is not novel.
Instead, it is consistent with the objective standard imposed in
all prejudgement determinations of sufficiency of evidence.

See

State Br. at 24.
While Anderson recognized that a preliminary hearing is
a critical stage in a criminal prosecution, it did not grant
preliminary hearing magistrates greater authority than trial
judges to assess the credibility and reliability of evidence.
4

Cf. Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783 & 786.

Instead, Anderson

in two

footnotes referred to the Massachusetts' directed verdict rule
which recognized that "credibility is ordinarily a matter for the
jury, and it is not expected that judges will normally resolve
testimonial conflicts at the preliminary hearing," while
acknowledging that "cases do occasionally arise in which a
witness's testimony is so weak or contradicted by sufficiently
clear facts that the judge should have the power to dismiss the
case."

Anderson. 612 P.2d at 783 n.19 (quoting Myers v.

Commonwealth. 298 N.E.2d 819, 826 n.12 (Mass. 1973)).

See also

Anderson. 612 P.2d at 783 n.12 (under prima facie/directed
verdict standard, a preliminary hearing magistrate may only
refuse to bind over when " x a trial court would be bound to acquit
as a matter of law'," quoting Myers. 298 N.E.2d at 824.)
The Anderson/Myer directed verdict standard is no
different from the Pledger/Cruz standard and both are consistent
with the objective standard imposed anytime a court removes a
case from jury consideration.

Unless acting as the ultimate

fact-finder, courts may only assess witness credibility in the
unusual circumstance where the testimony is inherently
improbable, that is: "there must exist either a physical
impossibility of the evidence being true, or its falsity must be
5

apparent, without any resort to inferences or deductions."

State

v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) (arrest of judgment).
£££ $qgp Si-rut? v, BeggtQn CorPt/ 659 P.2d 799, 806 (Kan. 1983)
(a court may only disregard evidence when it is "clearly contrary
to some immutable law of physics or is hopelessly in conflict
with one or more established and uncontroverted physical facts")
(quoted with approval in Workman. 852 P.2d at 984).
Defendant's reliance on State v. Wodskow. 896 P.2d 29,
is also misplaced.

In Wodskow, the issue was whether it was

proper for a district court to "reverse" a magistrate's factual
finding that based on their testimony and demeanor, the child
victims had experienced "substantial emotional pain," an element
of the crime, without reviewing a complete transcript of the
lower court proceedings.

Id. at 31-32 & n.l.

The Wodskow

ruling, that reversal may not be predicated on review of an
incomplete record, is not unique to motions to quash.

Without a

complete record of the prior proceedings, any reviewing court
must presume the regularity of the prior proceedings and affirm
the lower court judgment.

See State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386,

1388 (Utah 1988); Call v. City of West Jordan. 788 P.2d 1049,
1053, cert, denied,

800 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1990).

Similarly, the issue infiilfiS/576 P.2d 876, was only
6

tangentially related Lo preliminary hearings; the real issu- was
whether a city judge conid be held J H contempt •
cornhuM

H seM'1! uii I p u I i mi nar^ hearing when directed to by the

district court

ld.L at 878

Following the first preliminary

hearing and bindover, defei ise att<
1 la i perjured himself.

dJ ii^jed I lid I niv witness

Id. The district court ordered a remand.

When the magistrate failed to conduct a second preliminary
•'MM r 'h"'1"! 1 he magistrate for contempt.
In concluding that there was no basis to hold the magistrate in
contempt, the supreme court isLated llii.il e\ t"n if Mi i e liad been
y auring Lnr= preliminary hearing, "Lilt could not
oe said as a i ^:?.-j .

r

" . - ' " -;" "h~ judge conducting the

pre.. ..m:.-- , ..

v-. nut

other evxaence sufficient L_ cause T

committing magistrate -

find probable cause that the defendant was the one wh
i IIH Mfieiiisi" < "liai q^d

|ij , .if B" '>» (emphasis added).

The court

then held that i n ruling on a motion to quash, a district court
limitec ^

^n

o tl le pi ocedi ;ii es siii: :i : oi ind I ng the

preliminary hearing, and * — —
evidence.

Id. "*" orws

'nature and character" of the

Again, vv..

languag

Giles contains generalized
whom he

chose," id. at 879, in context, the decision does not adopt a
7

subjective standard over an objective one.
Contrary to defendant's assertions, sufficiency -- and
therefore, credibility --is only at issue in probable cause
determinations to the extent that the court can say, as a matter
of law, that the evidence is insufficient to support the
allegations.

Pledger/ 896 P.2d at 1229.

Cf. State v. Humphrey.

823 P.2d 464, 465-66 (a district court's review of a bindover
order is solely to determine if, as a matter of law, the court's
jurisdiction has been properly invoked).

See also State's Br. at

26-27.
Utah's imposition of an objective standard follows the
majority view.

As discussed in the State's Opening Brief at 25,

the Colorado Supreme Court views the issue as jurisdictional: A
preliminary hearing court has authority to ''consider the
credibility of witnesses only when, as a matter of law, the
testimony is implausible or incredible."

Hunter v. District

Court. 543 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Colo. 1975).

Accord People in

Interest of M.V.. 742 P.2d 326, 329 (Colo. 1987).

See also

People v. Superior Court (Kneip). 268 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3 (Cal. Ct.
App. 6 Dist. 1990) ("the evidence need not be unambiguous for
purposes of a bindover; raising a reasonable possibility of guilt
suffices"); State v. Patterson. 570 A.2d 174, 179 (Conn. 1990)
8

("when reviewing a motion t o dismiss an information, the
proffered

pi oo t

is

I i i IH

">" i i wi -i 1 nn u. I

t .1 <rr u H I > I 7 I > • I I IH s f a t e" ) ;
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. *... defence
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judge
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1986)
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and whether,
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~

(if

credible evidence exists to support and negate an element, a
qut-ijl ion i,;.l i 'ii'l

P >:

i nt" r: wl' 1 ' I"

Further, defendant
is allowed to subjectively
r

,|,|lli,|,, ,

'ti,l d b e

ICIL
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_

>_

) .

£ argument that unles- a magistrate

~ ,-

.-

x. of Defendant at ^

-w, , remonstrates a

misunderstanding of the function of probable cause

9

es

determinations.

Preliminary hearings are not trials. Anderson.

612 P.2d at 783 (preliminary hearing evidence need not be of the
same quality or quantity as that required for conviction).
their functions are multiple, they are also limited.

While

Defendants

are entitled to know the charges and basic evidence against them
but the prosecution is not required to produce all the evidence.
Pledger. 896 P.2d at 1229 (recognizing presumption that state's
evidence will strengthen from preliminary hearing to trial).
Bindovers may be predicated on otherwise inadmissible evidence,
including unconstitutionally obtained evidence, and this
inadmissible evidence may serve as the sole predicate for
probable cause.

Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(2).

standard of proof is required.

Only the lowest

Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229.

Yet, defendant argues that despite the limited nature
of a preliminary hearing, a magistrate conducting such a hearing
should be granted greater discretion in rejecting evidence than
any other judge at any other stage of judicial proceedings.
makes no sense.

This

It would grant greater authority to a justice of

the peace in a non-adjudicatory hearing than to a district court
judge in trial proceedings.
The Utah Supreme Court has wisely rejected such a
topsy-turvy approach.

Instead, magistrates are bound by the same
10

rules as trial judges.
at 728-29.
\

Pledger, 896 T.Lcl n'

122?

Cruz , fC~ T 2d
i

Neither may inva

cea to objective assessments of credibi-it-y.

896 ; 2d 4" 4f
Apt

-

£&£ also State v, Lagtod, n*i
*-sii.i

^OQMl i ' '"'*

Jaeger.

P.?C ^

I1

1985), " [i] t is the exclusive function of t lie

Ll^>

J<±D

(Utah

jury l.o wei gh the

evidence and determine the credibility uJ w i L new^i-^. ) .
Defendant "'

rrmn".ssion that the magistrate in this case engaged

in no more than a subjective evaluation of the evidence

"•

establishes th<j "«» nf ^ " is ( Id i

Reply to Defendant's Aggeytion that the
Standard of Probable Cause Applicable to

Preliminary Hearings jg Distinct from Fourth
Amendment Probable Cause
T]ie

state recognizes that it did not ai gue below and,

therefore, did not preserve the argument that only ** f^virth
drntMn linen!

hearings.

.* I >-i i m l »i i i " ' I |™»t « »11«1111 i* i H I I I * - HI in 1 j i '. 1 i i | n * 1 i m i nri l y

This argument was raised , ; Jaeger and Wodskow. where

the State argued in essence that
the probable cause needed for a bindover was
traditionally based on a magistrate's finding
that an offense had been, committed and that
the defendant was %lguilty" of the offense.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-7 (1978) (repealed).
However, in 1980, the Utah Legislature
amended the statute to state that a
magistrate shall bindover after finding
11

probable cause to believe that the defendant
had "committed" the offense. Utah Code Ann,
§ 77-35-6 (a) (1982) (repealed).1 The State
argues that because the term "committed"
mirrors the language defining a lesser
standard of probable cause for issuing an
arrest warrant, the 1980 amendment must have
been intended to equate the standard of
probable cause needed for a bindover with
that needed for an arrest warrant. See Utah
Code Ann. § 77-7-5 (1995) ("A magistrate may
issue a warrant for arrest upon finding
probable cause to believe that the person to
be arrested has committed a public offense.")
Jaeger. 896 P.2d at 44(footnote and emphasis in original).

See

also Wodskow. 896 P.2d at 31. However, in both cases, this Court
refused to reach the merits based on the State's failure to
preserve the argument below and lack of exceptional circumstances
to overcome this failure.
For this reason, the State did not raise the issue in
its opening brief in this case.

Despite this, defendant devotes

considerable argument to claim that probable cause for
preliminary hearings requires a higher finding of probable cause
than for arrests.

See Def. Br. at 2, 11-12.

Defendant appears

to be urging this Court to openly reject the State's
Jaeger/Wodskow argument that a prima facie- standard of probable

1

"The substance of this provision is now contained in Rule 7(h)(2) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure/' Jaeger, 896 P.2d at 44 n.2.
12

cause is no longer applicable.
W h i l e tl: le -State i s p i e e l i ided f i 01: 1: 1 a i g t id 1: ig the 111:: lie :i : :i t s ,
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on no more t h a n h i s s u b j e c t i v e a s s e s s m e n t r

• •>

a 11 v d .11 <"»•' 1II

J 1: 1
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No

brief
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dismissing the felony information should be reversed.
Accordingly
<

tuir

^^zrt

should remand zti:& matter to the circuit

.'

defendant
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